This is NOT an official USMC combat operations page, but my personal attempt to recover as much information as I can about the operations my husband Brad and his fellow 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines participated on in Vietnam. DR

OPERATION SHELBYVILLE

21-28 September 1967

3rd Battalion, 5th Marines After Action Report

AFTER ACTION REPORT SUMMARY FOR OPERATION SHELBYVILLE
(Included in LtCol. W. K. Rockey's Command Chronology for period 0100H Sept 67 to 302400H Sept 67)

1. INTELLIGENCE

    a. During the planning for Operation SHELBYVILLE the enemy was known or suspected to have the following forces disposed in the area of operation:

        Q-13 Company Reported at BT 0251 in late August; suspected of early September displacement to BT 1052.

       Q-15 Company With suspected disposition at BT 0360.

       R-20 Battalion Reported at AT 8852 in mid-August; suspected of early September displacement to AT 9952.

       V-25 Battalion Reported at BT 0654 and BT 1952 in mid-September.

    b. This whole area, including the Island, is a movement route from the Western side of the "Rocket Belt" to the suspected VC supply center at Cho Ba Market area, BT 2044. Accordingly, many pre-operation intelligence reports were available indicating as many as five enemy battalions. Third Battalion, Fifth Marines pre-operation estimate reported one VC Battalion (Main Force) harboring on the Island; Q-13 Company and unknown elements of the V-25 Battalion, possibly a recon element with missions in the AO.

   c. During the conduct of the operation, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines is believed to have had contact with one VCMF company on the night of 23 September 1967 at BT 02758. A second major contact was had on 25 September 1967 with one VCMF or NVA company at BT 004528. During this contact, the enemy established a "U" shaped ambush and engaged Lima Company after India Company had previously moved through the same general. area.

   d. No major (Platoon or Company) contact developed during the operation.

   e. Several snipers, individuals, and three man teams continued to attempt the delay of the Battalion's advance.

    f. Terrain

     (1) The whole area of operation was characterized by flat terrain flanked by two generally East-West rivers about four to five feet in depth in the South to over twelve feet in the North branch of Song Ky Lam.

    (2) The vegetation takes many forms, ranging from very thick bamboo treelines to high, thick grass and vines. This vegetation is so thick and frequent that fields of fire were never greater than 200 meters and, most often, less than 100. The single uniform exception to this were the few rice paddies formed in the central "Island" area only.

   g. Population. 

    (1) Detailed and/or brief screening interviews were conducted of the Vietnamese farm families by the Battalion Intelligence personnel. From these 26 interviews the following facts or Vietnamese opinions developed.

        (a) Of the people who lived on the "Island" 12 to 16 months ago, only one for every four now remain in the area.

        (b) Only six non-hostile Vietnamese males were observed out of some 140+people seen from the center of the Island to the Western river shores. Of those, all were over 50 years of age. All the families claimed that the younger, heads of the house were in Da Nang working.

        (c) The families and the living quarters were observed to be poorer than normally found in Que Son and Thang Binh Provinces.

    h. Rice Harvest

        (1) The few Dien Ben rice fields in the area of operation, according to 16 Vietnamese sources, are expected to yield not more than 1200 Tons of rice, starting on 1 October 1967.

            (a) It was difficult for the Vietnamese to explain who was going to harvest the rice with all the men "working in Da Nang" and based on previous answers to screening questions, not expected to return for "several months." One single source, a 74 year old man, personally interviewed by the Battalion Intelligence Office, admitted that sounds of VC from the South and North of the Island would come to help with the harvest. In some cases, the VC individually or in small groups own the fields.

    i. Structure and Ground Damage.

    (1) The area covered by 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines evidenced extensive damage to homes, out-buildings and fields as a result of aerial and artillery bombardment. Those few people remaining on the Island, who were strongly suspected of being VC families, were indifferent to the bombardment.

        (a) The man-made cover against artillery and medium ordnance, were found to be professional and extensive. Deep communication trenches and extra reinforced bunkers were far to numerous to plot on a map.

    j. Enemy Rocket Information

    (1) None of the Vietnamese Nationals interviewed claimed to have any knowledge of enemy rockets. Additionally, most of them know of the 100,000 piasters reward for rocket information but none believed the Government would let them keep the money.

    k. Enemy Losses

        KIA (CCC)-30
        KIA (P)-34
        WIA (C)- 3
        WIA (P)- 9

        l. Enemy Equipment Captured

        1  M-60 Machinegun
        6  Mixed auto and semi-auto rifles
       21 Chi Com Grenades (All destroyed in place)
       18  Items of serviceable "782" gear, VC and NVA
      900 lbs. (Approx) of hidden polished rice (given to local villagers in equal shares)
       20 lbs. of NVA class medical service gear (destroyed in place)

2. MISSION

To establish blocking positions by H-hour on D-day along the south bank of the Song Chiem Son River in the assigned AO to prevent enemy withdrawal or exfiltration to the South. To conduct deliberate and thorough search and destroy operations to kill, capture, and destroy enemy forces and equipment.

3. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

At 211600H Company I departed the Hill 63 Combat Base and moved North along Route #1 to the intersection of Highway #537 (BT 095528) then West to the blocking position at BT 015518. At 211800H Companies K and L and the Alpha Command Group followed in trace of Company I blocking positions at BT 048526 for Company K and BT 031529 for Company L and the Alpha Command Group.

4. EXECUTION  See Operations Overlay.

    a. 21 September 1967

        (1) At 1130H the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines received the First Marines Operation Order for Operation SHELBYVILLE.

        (2) At 1600H Company I departed Hill #63 as the advance guard for the Battalion (-), to move to the attack position at BT 015516.

        (3) At 1800H Companies K, L and the Alpha Command Group departed Hill #63 for attack positions east of Company I. Company L with the Alpha Command Group at BT 032513and Company K at BT 049512.

        (4) At 2100H Company L received fire from an ARVN compound at BT 127480 wounding one Marine. Order was restored, coordination again made and the march continued at 2230H.

    b. 22 September 1967

        (1) At 0230H 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines chopped to 1st Marines for Operation SHELBYVILLE.

        (2) At 0700H all companies commenced the attack into their respective blocking positions. Company I received approximately 20 sniper rounds from an estimated 3 VC from the vicinity of BT 023515. A sweep of the area was conducted with negative results. One Marine WIANE.

        (3) At 0830H Company L while conducting a search and destroy patrol saw 5 VC with weapons fleeing across a river at BT 031525. A search of the area revealed 5 VC KIA confirmed with one weapon captured along with various 782 gear.

        (4) At 1115H Company I spotted two VC across the river at BT 008524. Both were carrying weapons and taken under fire. Result were one VC KIA confirmed through field glasses and one VC KIA probable seen to fall and drag himself into the brush. The area wasn't searched because of boundary and barrier restriction.

        (5) All companies organize patrol bases in their objective areas and conducted local night activities.

    c. 23 September 1967

        (1) At 1000H the scout-sniper team with Company K spotted 4 VC wearing black and carrying weapons across the river moving into the treeline. The sniper fired 4 rounds and saw 3 VC fall and lay still. The fourth made it into the treeline.

        (2) At 1200H Companies I and L along with the Alpha Command Group repositioned their blocking positions. Company I moved to BT 036523 and Company L with the CP moved to BT 030524. All units continued to conduct aggressive search and destroy patrolling of our AC.

        (3) At 1425H the leading elements of Company I tripped what was believed to be a M-26 frag grenade booby-trap with a vine trip wire across the trail at BT 027523. Three (3) WIA Medevac.

        (4) At 1526H the Alpha Command Group found approximately 200 lbs. of rice and woo lbs. of salt at BT 035522. Kit Carson Scouts divided the rice and salt up in equal shares and handed it out to the families in the immediate area.

        (5) At 16ooH a Marine from company L tripped a M-26 frag grenade booby-trap while moving through a hedgerow. One WIA Medevac.

        (6) At 1730H Company K spotted 6 VN males and 3 VN females running from a patrol at BT 040522. Two of the males were carrying weapons and fired 2 rounds S/A fire at the patrol. the patrol returned fire. Search of the area revealed 2 VC KIA confirmed, one captured US carbine along with two blood trails leading from area indicating (2) VC KIA probable.

        (7) At 2030H a Company L, LP at BT 028529 sighted through a Starlight Scope 20 camouflaged VC. The LP took the enemy under fire and was withdrawn to the main COP.

        (8) At 2115H a Company L platoon size Combat outpost at BT 027528 was taken under sniper fire and occasional incoming grenades. Enemy fire was received from all sides throughout the night until 240330H. During the night both flare-ships and fire-flies were employed with excellent results. No friendly casualties were received with one NVA KIA confirmed and 20 KIA probables estimated from extensive blood trails and drag marks.

    d. 24 September 1967

        (1) At 0730H all units begin moving to a river fording site at BT 012521.

        (2) At 0900H Company I received approximately 10 rounds incoming sniper fire from BT 013513. Blackcoat adjusted an 81mm mortar mission and a platoon swept through the area observing 3 VC in green uniforms with weapons moving into the brush. The platoon took them under fire and saw 2 VC fall. Results of search located 2a distinct blood trails but no VC bodies. No friendly casualties and 2 VC KIA probables.

        (3) At 1100H Dreamhour 3-4 spotted 20-30 VC in the open at BT 007518 to AT 990516. Dreamhour controlled two flights of fixed wing with the following results: 6 VC KIA confirmed, 5 VC KIA probable, and 5 fighting holes destroyed.

        (4) At 1730H the leading elements of Company I were taken under heavy auto and semi-automatic S/A fire at BT 010525. Company I returned fire immediately but the enemy broke contact and moved NW. Five (5) friendly WIA's Medevac.

        (5) At 1830H all units had consolidated at BT 010524 and conducted local night activities.

    e. 25 September 1967

        (1) At 1130H Company L received heavy semi automatic, automatic S/A fire and M-79 fire from an estimated 20-25 VC dug in the vicinity of BT 005527. Artillery was requested but was ineffective due to numerous check fires because of helicopters in the area. Fixed wing was requested with negative results. Aircraft were launched but were diverted for a higher priority elsewhere. 81mm mortars were effectively employed. Results: 5 WIA Medevac, friendly.

        (2) At 1330H Company L detected 3 M16A1 Bouncing Betty mines at BT 003526. All were blown in place.

        (3) At 1550H the scout sniper team attached to Company K spotted 2 VC with weapons at BT 015520. The sniper fired 2 rounds and saw one VC fall and remain in position. The second fled into the tall grass. Area was not searched because of boundary and barrier but was kept under surveillance until dark with negative results. One VC KIA confirmed.

        (4) At 1600H one erratic 81mm mortar round fell short at BT 010524 killing two Marines and wounding five others. All were evacuated immediately and no other ammunition from that particular lot was fired. Investigation has been conducted. Results" faulty ammunition-Require reports submitted.

        (5) At 1710H the Alpha Command Group received a heavy volume of S/A fire and M-79 rounds from BT 010519 to BT 014520 from an estimated 15 (+) VC. An airstrike was run and the enemy immediately broke contact and fled south. Result: one VC KIA confirmed and one VC KIA probable. One Marine KIA and one Marine WIA Medevac.

        (6) At 1900H all units consolidated at BT 006528 and conducted local night activities.

    f. 26 September 1967

        (1) At 0700H Company L continued the attack to secure Objective #1 at AT 999528 with Companies K, I and CP in trace. After securing Objective #1 Company K passed through Company L and continue the attack to Objective #2 at ATA 926528.

        (2) At 1635H Company K, while conducting thorough search and destroy in the vicinity of AT 981529, found one NVA KIA in a trench line. Enemy had black trousers and a green jacket on but had no weapon. 1 VC KIA confirmed.

        (3) At 1805H all units consolidated in the vicinity of AT 985528 and conducted local night activities.

        (4) At 2135H a Company L squad size combat outpost spotted 3 VC with heavy camouflage moving in a westerly direction at AT 988530. Outpost took them under fire and heard one VC yell loudly. Search of area at first light revealed one heavy drag mark-one VC KIA probable.

    g. 27 September 1967

        (1) At 0730H the attack was continued with Companies K and L abreast with company I and the CP moving in trace to the vicinity of AT 051438 and then to the vicinity of AT 969553.

        (2) At 1100H Company L found 2 NVA KIA confirmed at AT 976528. Both appeared to have been hit with 81mm mortars. Both had NVA uniforms, packs, cartridge belts and weapons. One K-44 and one M-60 machine gun.

        (3) At 1610H Company I while seeping through their TOA found 2 VC hiding along the river bank at AT 970554. Both were taken under fire before they could throw a grenade and were killed. The search of the area revealed 6 Chi Com grenades, 2 packs and 3 cartridge belts along with one US 30 Cal Carbine, one MAS 36 rifle and one SKS rifle.

    h. 28 September 1967

        (1) At 0700H Operation SHELBYVILLE terminated.

        (2) At 0935H all units moved to the vicinity of AT 928528 for helilift to Hill #63.

        (3) At 1300H the first units began lifting back to Hill #63.

        (4) At 1620H the last unit arrived at Hill 63.